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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
A split of authority exists among the federal circuit courts on the question of 
whether Miranda warnings, to be sufficient, must specifically include the right to the 
presence of counsel during custodial interrogation.  Appealing from the district court’s 
order granting Tyrell Garrett McNeely’s motion to suppress his confession offered 
during a custodial interrogation, the state presents this question as an issue of first 
impression in the State of Idaho. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On May 15, 2015, McNeely was in custody in the Franklin County Sheriff’s Office 
incident to his arrest for a misdemeanor probation violation.  (Tr., p.17, L.23 – p.18, 
L.10.)  Detective Jensen had previously received a report that McNeely had sexual 
contact with a minor, T.E., and had sought to contact McNeely in order to interview him.  
(Tr., p.8, L.24 – p.9, L.11; State’s Ex. 1 at 1:15 – 1:45; 2:55 – 4:05.)  Recognizing 
McNeely when he came into the office, Detective Jensen requested the interview.  (Id.)  
As the interview began, Detective Jensen advised McNeely of his rights under 
Miranda.1  (Tr., p.11, L.23 – p.12, L.13; see also State’s Ex. 1 at 1:40 – 2:15.)  McNeely 
then confessed to engaging in sexual intercourse with T.E. when she was 14 years old 
and he was 18.  (See State’s Ex. 1 at 4:15 – 5:30, 9:25 – 10:50.) 
The state charged McNeely with lewd and lascivious conduct.  (R., pp.53-54.)  
McNeely filed a motion to suppress his confession, asserting that his statements were 
coerced and that he was not sufficiently advised of his right to counsel.  (R., pp.70-71, 
                                            
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
2 
83-90, 97-99.)  The district court held a hearing on the suppression motion.  (R., pp.94-
95; see also Tr.)  Following the hearing, the district court, believing that it was bound by 
precedent from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, granted 
McNeely’s suppression motion.  (R., pp.107-17.)  The state filed a notice of appeal 
timely from the order granting suppression.  (R., pp.125-27.) 
3 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it granted McNeely’s suppression motion on the 
mistaken belief that precedent from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 





The District Court Erred When It Granted McNeely’s Motion To Suppress 
 
A. Introduction 
Before Detective Jensen began questioning McNeely in relation to his sexual 
contact with a minor, T.E., the detective advised McNeely of his rights under Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  (Tr., p.11, L.23 – p.12, L.13; see also State’s Ex. 1 at 
1:35 – 2:15.)  The district court set forth the following relevant dialogue: 
Detective Jensen:  You kind of got yourself in a spot. 
 
McNeely:  Uh huh. 
 
Detective Jensen:  And I need to visit with you about it.  But I 
need—I need to have you understand—I need to talk to you about—first 
about your rights. 
 
McNeely:  Kay. 
 
Detective Jensen:  Do you understand your rights? 
 
McNeely:  Uh, read them all to me again. 
 
Detective Jensen:  Okay.  You have the right to remain silent.  You 
understand that? 
 
McNeely:  Yes. 
 
Detective Jensen:  You have the right—uhm—because anything 
you say can and will be used against you in court. 
 
McNeely:  (Nodding his head up and down). 
 
Detective Jensen:  You have the right to have an attorney, do you 
understand that? 
 
McNeely:  (Simultaneously nodding his head up and down). 
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Detective Jensen:  To help you with—stuff. 
 
Detective Jensen:  And if you can’t afford an attorney we’ll provide 
one for you. 
 
Detective Jensen:  Do you understand all that? 
 
Mr. McNeely:  (Nodding his head up and down) Uh-huh. 
 
(R., p.112, (citing State’s Ex. 1).)  During subsequent questioning, McNeely admitted 
that he had sexual contact with T.E.  (State’s Ex. 1 at 4:15 – 5:30, 9:25 – 10:50.)  Later, 
he filed a motion to suppress his confession on the ground that the Miranda warnings 
he received were inadequate.  Applying the Ninth Circuit’s holding in United States v. 
Noti, 731 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1984), which it believed was binding, the district court 
determined that the Miranda warnings were insufficient and suppressed McNeely’s 
confession.  (R., pp.114-16.) 
The district court’s conclusion was erroneous on two grounds:  First, contrary to 
the district court’s conclusion, Idaho courts are not bound by precedent from the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.  Second, Detective Jensen’s warnings reasonably conveyed to 
McNeely his rights as required by Miranda, and so were adequate.  The district court’s 
suppression order should therefore be reversed and this case remanded. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the 
application of constitutional principles to those facts.  State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 
843, 103 P.3d 454, 456 (2004). 
6 
C. Authority From The Ninth Circuit Is Not Binding On Idaho Courts 
In reaching its determination that Detective Jensen’s warnings to McNeely were 
inadequate under Miranda, and that McNeely’s subsequent confession should therefore 
be suppressed, the district court explained: 
While the Court recognizes that there is room for debate 
concerning this issue and one might speculate that the United States 
Supreme Court will ultimately reach a different result, if and when they 
consider this precise issue, especially if one reads closely the United 
States Supreme Court’s decisions in California v. Prysock, [453] U.S. 355, 
359, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 69 L.Ed.2d 696 (1981) (per curium) and Duckworth 
[v. Egan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989)].  However, the Court believes that it is 
compelled to follow the directive and pronouncement of the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals on this issue and their pronouncement is quite clear in 
this respect.  See Noti. 
 
(R., p.116, n.9.)  The district court’s legal conclusion was incorrect; it is not required to 
follow the pronouncements of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
While both state and federal courts are bound by the United States Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of federal law, James v. City of Boise, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 
685, 686 (2016), state courts are not bound by the opinions of the federal circuit courts, 
Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc., v. Universal Computer Consulting Holding, Inc., 142 Idaho 235, 
240, 127 P.3d 138, 143 (2005) (“[T]he decisions of lower federal courts are not binding 
on state courts, even on issues of federal law.  Such decisions are authoritative only if 
the reasoning is persuasive.”) (internal citation omitted).  See also Clark v. Murphy, 331 
F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003) (“While circuit law may be ‘persuasive authority’ for 
purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application 
of Supreme Court law, only the Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state 
courts…”) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)); 
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W.G. Clark Const. Co. v. Pacific Northwest Regional Council of Carpenters, 322 P.3d 
1207, 1211 (Wash. 2014) (“Decisions of the federal circuit courts are ‘entitled to great 
weight’ [by state courts] but are not binding.”); People v. Barber, 799 P.2d 936, 940 
(Colo. 1990) (“Lower federal courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts 
and their decisions are not conclusive on state courts, even on questions of federal 
law.”); Loher v. State, 193 P.3d 438, 452 n.16 (Haw. App. 2008) (“Hawai‘i courts are not 
obligated to follow the decisions of the Ninth Circuit even on questions of federal 
constitutional law.”) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Auld, 361 P.3d 471 (Haw. 
2015)); State v. Allen, 166 P.3d 111, 116 n.4 (Ariz. App. 2007) (“Arizona state courts 
are not bound by the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of federal constitutional protections.”). 
This principle was well-articulated by Justice Thomas in his concurrence in 
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993): 
The Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal law, 
but neither federal supremacy nor any other principle of federal law 
requires that a state court’s interpretation of federal law give way to a 
(lower) federal court’s interpretation.  In our federal system, a state trial 
court’s interpretation of federal law is no less authoritative than that of the 
federal court of appeals in whose circuit the trial court is located.  An 
Arkansas trial court is bound by this Court’s (and by the Arkansas 
Supreme Court’s and Arkansas Court of Appeals’) interpretation of federal 
law, but if it follows the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of federal law, it does 
so only because it chooses to and not because it must. 
 
(parentheses original; internal citations omitted).  What was true of Arkansas in that 
case is also true of Idaho:  Idaho trial courts are bound by the United States Supreme 
Court’s (and by the Idaho Supreme Court’s and Idaho Court of Appeals’) interpretation 
of federal law, but if they follow the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of federal law, they do 
so only because they choose to and not because they must.  See, e.g., Dan Wiebold 
8 
Ford, Inc., 142 Idaho at 240, 127 P.3d at 143.  While authority from the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals may be persuasive, it is not binding on Idaho courts.  The district court 
erred when it concluded otherwise. 
 
D. Under The Facts Of This Case, Detective Jensen’s Warnings Were Sufficient To 
Fulfill The Requirements Of Miranda 
 
“Miranda warnings must be given to a suspect who is subject to custodial 
interrogation.”  State v. Kuzmichev, 132 Idaho 536, 543, 967 P.2d 462, 469 (1999) 
(citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).  These warnings include “[1] that he 
has the right to remain silent, [2] that anything he says can be used against him in a 
court of law, [3] that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and [4] that if he 
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so 
desires.”  Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 59-60 (2010) (brackets original; quoting 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479).  The Supreme Court, however, has “never insisted that 
Miranda warnings be given in the exact form described in that decision.”  Duckworth v. 
Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202-03 (1989).  “The inquiry is simply whether the warnings 
reasonably conveyed to a suspect his rights as required by Miranda.”  Id. at 203 
(internal brackets omitted; citing California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 361 (1981)). 
Below, that Detective Jensen adequately advised McNeely that he had the right 
to remain silent; that anything he said could be used against him; and that if he could 
not afford an attorney, one would be provided for him was never at issue.  (See R., 
pp.70-71, 88-90, 98.)  The only issue was whether Detective Jensen’s warning, “You 
have the right to have an attorney, do you understand that? … To help you with—stuff,” 
adequately informed McNeely of his right to counsel under Miranda.  McNeely asserted, 
9 
and the district court agreed, that this warning was constitutionally deficient because he 
was not specifically informed that he had “the right to the presence of an attorney before 
and during interrogation.”  (R., p.116.)   
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Idaho Supreme Court has ever 
held that such a specific warning is necessary to comply with the dictates of Miranda.  
The federal circuit courts are split on the question.  As noted by the district court, the 
Ninth Circuit in Noti, supra, determined that the warning must explicitly provide that the 
suspect is entitled to the presence of counsel during interrogation.  (R., pp.114-15.)  A 
similar approach has been adopted by the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits.  See, e.g., 
Atwell v. United States, 398 F.2d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Tillman, 963 
F.2d 137, 140-42 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Anthon, 648 F.2d 669, 672-74 (10th 
Cir. 1981).  More recently, however, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that 
there is no requirement that the warning of the right to counsel include “any express 
reference to the right to counsel during interrogation.”  United States v. Warren, 642 
F.3d 182, 186 (2011).  This same approach has also been followed by the Second, 
Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, which hold that a general warning of the right to 
counsel without the explicit “presence” and “during” language is adequate to fulfill the 
requirements of Miranda.  See, e.g., United States v. Lamia, 429 F.2d 373, 377 (2d Cir. 
1970) (a general warning of the right to an attorney adequately conveyed the 
defendant’s Miranda rights); United States v. Frankson, 83 F.3d 79, 81-82 (4th Cir. 
1996) (statement, “you have the right to an attorney” communicated to defendant “that 
his right to an attorney began immediately and continued forward in time without 
qualification”); United States v. Adams, 484 F.2d 357, 361-62 (7th Cir. 1973) (officer’s 
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warnings that defendants had “the right to remain silent, right to counsel, and if they 
haven’t got funds to have counsel, that the court will see that they are properly 
defended” satisfied Miranda); United States v. Caldwell, 954 F.2d 496, 500-04 (8th Cir. 
1992) (finding generalized warning sufficient under plain error standard). 
The Third Circuit’s Warren decision appears to be the most recent ruling by a 
federal circuit court on the issue.  In Warren, the interrogating officer recalled that, 
before questioning, he advised Warren  
that he had the right to remain silent.  Anything you say can and will be 
used against you in a court of law.  You have the right to an attorney.  If 
you cannot afford to hire an attorney, one will be appointed to represent 
you without charge before any questioning if you wish.  Should you decide 
to talk to me, you can stop the questioning any time. 
 
Id., 642 F.3d at 184.  Warren argued, similar to McNeely in this case, that the officer’s 
Miranda warnings were deficient for failing to specifically advise him of his continuing 
right to counsel after questioning commenced.  Id.  After carefully reviewing the relevant 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, including its Miranda decision, the Third 
Circuit rejected that argument.  Id. at 184-85.  It noted that the question under Supreme 
Court precedent was whether there was any language in the warning that would appear 
to limit the right to counsel.  Id. at 185.  Because the officer’s general warning, “[y]ou 
have the right to an attorney,” did not limit that right to counsel, it satisfied Miranda.  Id. 
at 185-86. 
Likewise, though Detective Jensen’s warning, that McNeely had “the right to 
have an attorney … [t]o help [him] with—stuff,” was not eloquently stated, it also did not 
limit McNeely’s right to counsel in relation to his interrogation.  Moreover, the detective’s 
follow-up comment that “if you can’t afford an attorney we’ll provide one for you” (R., 
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p.112 (emphasis added), at a minimum implies a right to have the attorney during the 
questioning by the police who would be providing the attorney.  The warning was 
therefore sufficient to advise McNeely of his rights under Miranda. 
Moreover, a careful review of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Miranda, like that 
conducted by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, shows that Detective Jensen’s 
warnings would have been sufficient to meet the model standard endorsed by the 
Supreme Court in that case.  See Id., 384 U.S. at 483-86.  In Miranda, the United States 
Supreme Court explained: 
Over the years the Federal Bureau of Investigation has compiled an 
exemplary record of effective law enforcement while advising any suspect 
or arrested person, at the outset of an interview, that he is not required to 
make a statement, that any statement may be used against him in court, 
that the individual may obtain the services of an attorney of his own choice 
and, more recently, that he has a right to free counsel if he is unable to 
pay. 
 
Id. at 483.  The Court then reviewed responses from the Office of the Solicitor General 
to questions raised during oral arguments regarding the specific warnings and 
summarized those warning as follows: 
The standard warning long given by Special Agents of the FBI to both 
suspects and persons under arrest is that the person has a right to say 
nothing and a right to counsel, and that any statement he does make may 
be used against him in court.  Examples of this warning are to be found in 
[Westover v. United States, 342 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1965)] and Jackson v. 
U.S., [337 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1964)]…. 
 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 484.2   
                                            
2  The Solicitor General’s answer is broader, also explaining (1) that after the passage 
of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 the counsel warning was expanded to include 
advising the suspect that, if he could not afford counsel, it would be provided for him; (2) 
that the warnings were given before questioning; and (3) that invoking the right to 
12 
In the Westover case, the Ninth Circuit related generally that “F.B.I. agents 
advised the appellant that he did not have to make a statement; that any statement that 
he made could be used against him in a court of law; [and] that he had the right to 
consult an attorney.”  Westover, 342 F.2d at 685.  In Jackson, the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals quoted the warnings offered by the agent, explaining that, following the 
suspect’s arrest, “the F.B.I. agent immediately advised [him] ‘that he did not have to 
make any statement, that any statement he did make would be used against him in a 
court of law, and that he was entitled to an attorney.’”  Id., 337 F.2d at 138.  
Furthermore, when Jackson was brought before the United States Commissioner, the 
Commissioner “advised him ‘that he did not have to say anything if he did not desire to, 
that he could have an attorney if he so desired.’”  Id.   
Detective Jensen’s simple, straightforward advisement that McNeely had the 
right to an attorney was the equivalent of the warnings long offered by the FBI, which 
were endorsed as a model by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda.  In the 
context of the other warnings, offered directly prior to police questioning, informing a 
suspect that he has “the right to have an attorney” is sufficient to advise the suspect of 
his right to an attorney under Miranda.  The district court’s order should therefore be 
reversed and this case remanded for further proceedings. 
                                                                                                                                            
counsel ended the interrogation until an attorney could be present.  Miranda, 384 U.S. 
at 484-86.  However, none of this appears relevant to the issue on appeal. 
13 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order 
granting suppression of McNeely’s confession and that it remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
 DATED this 5th day of August, 2016. 
 
 
      /s/ Russell J. Spencer____________________ 
      RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
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